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Seminal theoretical papers highlight that insurance and risk reducing protective measures are substitutes (Ehrlich and Becker 1972; Arnott and Stiglitz 1988) . According to the theory, insurance would discourage individuals from investing in loss reduction measures unless they are rewarded with a reduction in their premiums. This behavior may lead to moral hazard when individuals take fewer risk-reducing measures after purchasing insurance, and to adverse selection when it is mainly individuals with a high risk who demand insurance but the insurer cannot distinguish between high and low risk individuals. These two problems arise from information asymmetries in the sense that the higher risk-taking by the insured is not observed by the insurer and, therefore, not reflected in a higher risk based premium (Akerlof 1970; Rothschild and Stiglitz 1976) .
Recent work over the past decade reveals that some insured individuals may actually undertake additional measures to limit risk ex ante risk, which uninsured do not adopt, for example because they are (highly) risk averse. This behavior can lead to both insurance purchases and investments in risk reduction; this has been termed advantageous selection (de Meza and Webb 2001) 
or preferred risk selection (Finkelstein and McGarry 2006). Amy Finkelstein and Kathleen
McGarry (2006) find that individuals with private long term care insurance in the United States are more likely to engage in activities that reduce health risks, which in turn makes it less likely that they will ever use long-term care. Cutler et al. (2008) also show that positive relationships exist between individuals in the United States purchasing term life, annuities, medigap and long term care insurance and adopting risk reduction activities. The datasets used in these studies do not allow for examining the exact behavioral mechanisms behind the observed preferred risk selection, though.
Other empirical research has also shown that there can be significant heterogeneity in the relation between insurance coverage and risk reduction (Cohen and Siegelman 2010) . Einav et al. (2013) found that some individuals who engage in moral hazard have a higher demand for health insurance coverage, except for highly risk averse individuals with a high perceived health risk who do not engage in moral hazard and have a high willingness-to-pay for insurance coverage.
The lack of empirical evidence on adverse selection in some insurance markets may be consistent with the hypothesis that buyers are not maximizing their expected utility but it is also consistent with the hypothesis that little information asymmetry exists.
In this paper we examine the relationship between individual risk reduction activities and natural disaster insurance coverage as our field case by identifying behavioral mechanisms that may explain preferred risk selection. In particular we use the U.S. flood insurance market and the decisions by homeowners to reduce flood risk by investing in loss reduction measures as our context. Floods are the most costly source of natural disasters in the U.S. 1 , and there is an expectation that the frequency and severity of flooding will increase in the future as a result of climate change and the accompanying sea level rise (IPCC 2014) . Flood insurance for residential properties is almost exclusively purchased through the federally-run National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP), which covers more than $1.2 trillion of assets. This makes the NFIP the largest flood insurance program worldwide.
We make a temporal distinction between risk reduction activities that are normally adopted well before the risk (i.e. a flood disaster) materializes, such as dry proofing walls of a building to make them impermeable to water, and emergency preparedness measures that are undertaken during an imminent threat of a disaster, such as moving contents to higher floors to avoid them suffering flood damage. Loss reduction measures often have a high upfront cost with an uncertain benefit while emergency preparedness measures are generally less costly and have more certain risk reduction benefits.
Recent experiences with low-probability/high-impact events have given rise to an increasing interest in the economics literature in how people prepare for, and respond to, disasters (Barberis 2013 ). In particular, Hurricane Katrina in 2005 and Hurricane Sandy in 2012, which combined caused more than $150 billion in economic losses in the United States, showed the importance of undertaking protective measures to reduce future disaster damage (Munich Re, 2015) . Moreover, such disasters highlight the need to provide recovery funds through insurance should one suffer losses from a disaster and to find ways to improve disaster preparedness in the future.
Only a handful of studies have examined the relationship between investment in risk reduction and insurance purchase decisions for natural disasters (for a review see Hudson et al. 2017 ). Carson et al. (2013) show that homeowners in Florida who have high deductibles on their windstorm insurance are also more likely to take windstorm risk reduction measures. This 1 Over the period 1953-2011, two-thirds of all presidentially declared disasters were flood related (Michel-Kerjan and Kunreuther 2011). suggests that insurance coverage and wind risk reduction measures act as substitutes, at least in terms of the deductible amount. On the other hand, Petrolia et al. (2015) find a positive relation between the decision to purchase windstorm coverage and investment in measures that limit windstorm damage based on a sample of U.S. household along the Gulf coast. A follow-up study
by Hudson et al. (2017) using a different U.S. sample from the mid-Atlantic and Northeastern U.S revealed that households with homeowner's or flood insurance that are threatened to be hit by a hurricane are also more likely to engage in activities that minimize windstorm risks. With respect to flood risk, Thieken et al. (2006) and Hudson et al. (2017) find that insured households in Germany take more flood risk mitigation measures than households without flood insurance.
These studies, however, did not identify the behavioral mechanisms behind the relations between insurance and risk reduction activities, which we aim to do here.
Our study uses data from a survey we conducted of more than 1,000 homeowners who live in flood-prone areas in New York City (NYC). This dataset includes individual level information on implemented flood risk reduction measures and flood insurance purchases from the NFIP as well as a range of variables that influence these decisions, such as psychological characteristics, risk perceptions, experience of past flood damage and receipt of federal disaster assistance. Our individual level data is especially suitable for determining whether the relationship between insurance purchase and risk reduction activities by individuals are substitutes or complements, and for identifying the behavioral mechanisms behind these relationships.
The paper is organized as follows. Section I presents the data and the empirical methods. Section II presents the results. We find that insurance and long-term risk reduction measures taken ex ante a flood threat are complements, which is opposite to a moral hazard effect. In contrast, we find that people with insurance coverage are less likely to take short-term emergency preparedness measures during a flood threat. An examination shows that individuals both insure and take risk reduction measures for financial reasons, like experiencing high flood damage in the past and not having received federal disaster assistance for damage. Interestingly, we find that behavioral motivations to reduce risk outside of the standard economic model also play a role. Section III concludes and provides policy recommendations.
I. Data and empirical methods
The databases 2 of our survey consists of a random sample of homeowners in NYC that face flood risk who live in a house with a ground floor. The survey was implemented over the phone by a professional survey company about six months after NYC was flooded by Superstorm Sandy in October 2012. 1,035 respondents completed the survey (73% response rate). See Appendix A for more details about the survey method and survey questions. Following Cutler et al. (2008) we use probit models of (flood) insurance purchases and explanatory variables of flood risk reduction activities to examine the relationship between flood insurance purchases and flood risk reduction measures. The basic probit model is: We make a distinction between these two types of protective measures throughout our analysis because decision processes of taking these measures are likely to be different. Risk reduction measures taken ex ante a flood threat have relatively high upfront costs with uncertain risk reduction benefits that materialize if a flood occurs. Emergency preparedness measures taken during a flood threat, like moving contents to higher floors and installing flood shields, are often 2 Part of this survey data has been used in previous studies that focused on examining determinants of flood risk perceptions (Botzen et al. 2015) and assessing the role of political affiliation in flood risk perceptions and demand for risk mitigation (Botzen et al. 2016) . The latter study showed that political affiliation is not a significant determinant of flood insurance purchases, and hence this variable is not further considered here.
relatively less expensive, but require the household to take action in a situation of emergency when the likelihood of a flood occurring is now almost certain. Of main interest is whether coefficients α 1 and α 2 are negative, pointing toward households' behavior consistent with a moral hazard effect (hypothesis 1), or whether these coefficients are positive, revealing an opposite preferred risk selection effect (hypothesis 2).
Estimating equation (1a,b) provides insights into how insurance purchase decision is related with investments in loss prevention. To examine how other variables influence the decision to buy insurance and potentially affect the relationship between Yi and Mi, two other models are estimated: a traditional economic model and a behavioral economic model, respectively.
The traditional economic model is: Table B1 .
R i are variables of risk perception measured as perceived flood probability and consequences in line with subjective expected utility theory (Savage 1954) . F i is a dummy variable representing respondents who have received federal disaster assistance for flood damage in the past. They may expect the government to compensate them for damage suffered from a future flood, which can lower their demand for insurance and risk reduction measures. This crowding out effect has been called the Samaritan's dilemma or charity hazard (Buchanan 1975; Raschky et al. 2013) .
The traditional economic model is also estimated for mandatory flood insurance purchases, because budget constraints due to low income and the receipt of federal disaster assistance in the past may be reasons for not adhering to the mandatory purchase requirements of the NFIP.
Next, a behavioral economic model is estimated to examine factors and motivations that are likely to lead to purchasing insurance voluntarily:
, Variables M i , F i and X i are similar to those for equation 2. A difference in (3) is that risk perception R i in (2) is now represented by T i which is a variable indicating respondents who think that the flood probability is below their threshold level of concern. This variable is included since other studies have found that individuals may use a threshold model in assessing lowprobability/high-impact risk (Slovic et al. 1977; McClelland et al. 1993; Kunreuther et al. 2001; Botzen et al. 2015) . This model implies that many individuals choose not to insure because they ignore the flood risk. B i consists of behavior variables that examine whether individuals purchase insurance because it gives them peace of mind, and whether their decision to purchase coverage is affected by their locus of control, their own internal values or a social norm.
The peace of mind variable is included because affect and emotion-related goals appear to have an important influence on decision making under risk (Loewenstein et al. 2001) . Individuals may purchase insurance to reduce anxiety, and to avoid anticipated regret not to have bought it should a disaster happens and consolation (Krantz and Kunreuther 2007) , which is captured by this variable.
Locus of control is a personality trait which reflects a belief about the degree to which an individual exerts control over his or her own life, in contrast to external environmental factors, such as fate or luck (Rotter 1966) . It has been shown that locus of control influences economic decision making in various domains such as earnings (Heineck and Anger 2010), entrepreneurship (Evans and Leighton 1989), investments in education (Coleman and Deleire 2003) and in health (Chiteji 2010) . It can be expected that individuals with an external locus of control 3 think they have little influence over outcomes in their life and are less likely to prepare for disasters and purchase flood insurance (Baumann and Sims 1978; Sattler et al. 2000) . 3 The external locus of control variable is defined by respondes to the question "Some people feel they have completely control over their lives, while other people feel that what they do has no real effect on what happens to them. Please indicate on a scale from 1 to 10 where 1 means "none at all" and 10 means "a great deal" how much control you feel you have over the way your life turns out." which is based on the U.S. World Values Survey (see Appendix A). The dummy variable of an external locus of control equals 1 if the respondent answered 1 through 5 on this scale and 0 otherwise.
Moreover, norms may be a motivation for people to prepare for disasters, as has been shown for the influence of norms on other economic decisions, like consumption, work effort, and cooperation in public good provision, and perceived fairness of income distributions and uses of (public) money, as reviewed by Jon Elster (1989). Being adequately prepared for a specific risky situation may be regarded as a social norm, so that households do not need to rely on others for assistance during and after a disaster. For recycling decisions by individuals Viscusi et al. (2011) show that it is important to distinguish between a person's behavior due to the actions of others and private values. In our study, a social norm refers to approval of others of being well prepared for flooding, while a private value refers to behavior that the respondent finds to be personally important. 4 Both the social norm and the private value may be positively related to taking risk reduction measures and purchasing flood insurance.
5
Moreover, we estimate two variants of (3) which include interaction terms with ex ante risk reduction measures in order to examine how behavioral and financial mechanisms relate to the adoption of both risk reduction measures and purchase of insurance. First, we examine how the behavioral characteristics B i influence the decision to both purchase flood insurance and adopt risk reduction measures by creating interactions terms of these Bi variables with the ex ante risk reduction variable. In particular, the norm and locus of control variables can reflect internal preferences of the individual with regard to risk preparedness which may affect decisions to both insure and implement risk reduction measures. Second, a model is estimated to examine how the interaction between risk reduction and flood insurance purchases is related to financial incentives through previous flood damage and past federal disaster assistance. Experiencing severe flood damage may trigger the adoption of ex ante risk reduction measures and the purchase of insurance when individuals perceive that insurance coverage alone is insufficient for coping with future flood events. Individuals who have received federal disaster assistance may expect the federal government to cover their future losses. They therefore are less likely to invest in risk 4 The private value was measured using the question "Please tell me if you strongly agree, agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree or strongly disagree with the following statement: I would be upset if I noticed that someone who got flooded was insufficiently prepared for flooding and needed to request federal compensation for flood damage he suffered." For eliciting the social norm, the text was: "Other people would be upset if they noticed that someone who got flooded was insufficiently prepared for flooding and needed to request federal compensation for flood damage he suffered" (see Appendix A). The private value and social norm variables take on the value 1 if the respondent agreed or strongly agreed with the statement and zero otherwise. 5 See Appendix A for examples of social norms and private values in the context of the flood preparedness reduction measures and purchase insurance than if they believed they would be responsible for the costs of repairing their damage after a disaster.
II. Results

A. Descriptive analyses
Of our total number of respondents, 44% purchased flood insurance because doing so was mandatory, 21% purchased it voluntarily, 33% did not have flood insurance and 2% did not know whether they had flood coverage. Figure 1 shows the relation between having flood insurance coverage and the implementation of specific (structural) risk reduction measures, which are taken ex ante a flood threat. These measures often have substantial upfront investment costs and limit damage during flood events.
If insurance and risk reduction measures are substitutes then one would expect that individuals with flood insurance coverage would undertake fewer risk reduction measures than individuals without flood insurance, because FEMA does not give premium discounts for policyholders who adopt such measures. The one exception is if a homeowner elevates his home and therefore this measure is not considered in our analysis. 6 As shown in Figure 1 , individuals who voluntarily and mandatorily purchased flood insurance are also more likely to take ex ante risk reduction measures than the uninsured, which is statistically significant for building with water-resistant materials, having a water-resistant floor, and elevating utility and electric installations. 
B. Results of statistical models
The results of simple probit models (equation 1) of relations with insurance purchases and risk reduction measures are shown in Appendix Table 1 shows the results of probit models of flood insurance purchases with explanatory variables motivated by a standard economic model of decision making under risk (equation 2).
7 This sign change is not caused by multi-collinearity. The correlation between these two variables is only 0.31. Table 1 also finds a significant negative relation between having insurance and undertaking emergency preparedness measures shortly in advance or during flood events, while this negative effect was statistically insignificant in the simple model without control variables (equation 1, shown in Appendix Table B2 ).
In other words, while accounting for standard economic explanatory variables that influence estimates of the flood probability 10 instead of the perceived flood probability (Appendix Table   8 The perceived flood probability is measured as a dummy variable of respondents who expect that their flood probability is higher than 1/100. Similar results are obtained if instead this variable is specified as a continuous variable of the respondent's best estimate of the flood probability, which is not included in the reported model in Table 1 because of its large number of missing observations (N drops to 169 for voluntary purchases). 9 This variable is measured as a variable of the expected flood damage relative to the respondent's property value. This is an indicator of perceived severity of flooding, like the objective risk indicator of the potential water depth during a flood. In addition we estimated a model with the absolute value of expected flood damage as an explanatory variable, which turned out to have an insignificant marginal effect, but has similar results for the other explanatory variables. In other words, our main results are robust to this alternative specification. again which would be a typical charity hazard effect. We find that the latter effect dominates.
The marginal effect of this variable is rather large; the probability of having flood insurance is about 0.2 lower after receiving disaster relief. A variable of having received disaster assistance but in the form of a loan turned out to be statistically insignificant (not shown in Table 1 ), suggesting that compensations through loans are not a substitute for insurance, which confirms early results by Kousky, Michel-Kerjan and Raschky (2013).
A significant income effect is present for voluntary flood insurance purchases. This is captured by a dummy variable of households with a low total household income (<$25,000) since results
Usually high risk areas are defined as those where there is a higher-than 1 percent chance of being flooding in any given year. Also, the publicly available FEMA flood zone classifications do not have a significant influence on voluntary flood insurance purchases (results not shown in Table 1 ). 10 This may not be surprising since the accuracy of the NYC FEMA flood zone classification has been highly debated (Aerts et al. 2013) . 11 Potential water depth is measured as the mean of the inundation level based on 549 storm simulations of the census block of the respondent in feet, which is derived from the flood damage model in Aerts et al. (2014) . 12 About 37% of the respondents received federal disaster assistance for flood damage they experienced in the past. The average federal disaster compensation received was $21,908 which is substantial, but lower than the average compensation of $34,766 that respondents with flood coverage received in insurance payments. of a model that includes variables of all income categories show that only falling in the low income category significantly reduced flood insurance demand, while differences in demand between higher income levels are insignificant. 13 This implies that concerns about insurance affordability are valid, which has been topic of much debate recently (Kousky and Kunreuther 2014). Voluntary insurance purchases are positively related with having a high education level.
14 These results for socio-economic variables suggest that more vulnerable social groups with a low income and low education level are less likely to purchase flood insurance, and, thereby, have worse financial protection against flood damage. Notes: *,**,*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Next, we examine in more detail the behavioral motivations for voluntarily purchasing insurance and for combining this insurance coverage with risk reduction measures. Table 2 shows the results of a model with explanatory variables that are motivated by a range of behavioral economic theories that postulate that individuals base decisions under risk on intuitive thinking and other psychological decision processes (equation 3). In particular, the model includes a threshold variable of perceived risk that represents respondents who think that the probability their house will suffer a flood is below their threshold level of concern, and variables of a private value of preparing for flooding, individual locus of control, and purchasing flood insurance because it gives peace of mind. Moreover, we examined whether in addition to these variables, flood experience 15 significantly influences voluntary flood insurance purchases. This did not turn out to be the case (results not shown in Table 2 ), which may be due to the large share of our respondents (about 75%) that had been flooded in the past. States is influenced by private values and not external social norms, and conclude that it is important to distinguish these two types of variables as we do here. Moreover, we find that peace of mind is an important motivation for individuals to purchase flood insurance. About 70% of the respondents indicated that they were similar to a person who buys insurance (in general) because it gives her/him peace of mind. Our probit model results (Table 2) shows that these individuals are significantly more likely to purchase flood insurance. 15 We examined the influence of flood experience by testing different models with the following indicators of flood experience: a dummy variable of whether a respondent experienced flooding in the past (=1) or not (=0), a variable of the number of times a respondent has been flooded, and a variable of the damage the respondent suffered from the last flood event. These variables were statistically insignificant and have been excluded from the model in Table 2 . It should be noted that the main relations between flood insurance purchases and implementation of damage mitigation measures remain similar in these models that control for flood experience. 16 We examined whether individuals are more likely to have a strong private value for flood protection when they received federal disaster assistance in the past or experienced high flood damage, and found that these relations are statistically insignificant. 0.12 Notes: *,**,*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
The results of the previous models show that when we control for relevant independent variables that influence flood insurance purchases, a consistent positive relation between flood insurance and the implementation of ex ante risk reduction measures is found. For households in our sample, insurance and risk reduction measures are complements.
Next we examine whether these variables directly influence these relations by adding interaction terms with the risk reduction variable. These variables are included only as interaction terms and not separately to prevent potential problems with multicollinearity. 17 In particular, the left column of Table 3 shows a model with interactions terms of behavioral characteristics. We examined a model that included interactions of the risk reduction measures variable with peace 17 Correlation statistics of these separate variables with the interaction term are about 0.7. of mind, the threshold level of concern, the private value of preparing for floods and external locus of control. The interactions of risk reduction with peace of mind and the threshold level of concern are insignificant (not shown here) and model fit is better when these variables are included independently, as is done in the model in Table 3 .
The interaction term risk reduction measures × strong private value of preparing for floods is significant at the 5% level. The positive sign implies that individuals with a high private value to prepare for flooding are more likely to take both risk reduction measures and purchase flood insurance. The negative marginal effect of the interaction risk reduction measures × external locus of control suggests that individuals with an external locus of control are less likely to take both flood insurance and ex ante risk reduction measures, but this effect is only weakly significant (p-value=0.08).
The right column of Table 3 in the past find it easy to imagine this could occur again in the future and, therefore, prepare well for flooding. Moreover, a reason for this may be that insurance reimbursements for flood damage in the past were insufficient which is why insured individuals also take flood damage mitigation measures. As an illustration, our respondents who received compensation for flood damage they experienced in the past indicate that the amount of compensation they received was on average only about 45% of the total damage they suffered to their building and home contents. This past high level of uncompensated flood damage by insurance can also reconcile our finding in Table   3 that past flood damage influences the decision to both purchase insurance and take risk reduction measures with the previous result that past flood damage did not significantly influence the purchases of flood insurance independently. Taking both insurance and risk reduction measures for the uncovered risk may be seen as an effective strategy to deal with high flood damage by our respondents.
The negative significant marginal effect of the variable risk reduction measures × received disaster assistance implies that individuals who have received federal disaster assistance for flood damage in the past are less likely to both take flood insurance and ex ante risk reduction measures. Pseudo R2 0.11 0.14 Notes: *,**,*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
III. Conclusions
While the economics literature often assumes that insurance purchase and adoption of preventive measures are substitutes, several empirical studies on the purchase of health-related insurance, have shown this is not the case. Explanations put forward for those findings are that individuals select into buying insurance based on risk preferences which also cause them to undertake other risk reduction measures. We offer an examination of this behavior in the context of lowprobability/high-impact disaster risks, specifically, floods. We focused on floods since they have caused hundreds of billion of dollars losses in the United States alone over the last decades and have also affected more people and caused more economic losses worldwide than any other natural disaster (CRED, 2015) . With the growing concentration of population and assets in flood prone areas in a number of countries, this risk is likely to become an even more important issue in the years to come
The overall pattern of results shows that long before individuals are faced with a threat of experiencing a loss from flooding they are likely to both have flood insurance and take risk reduction measures in their home to limit future flood damage. This behavior implies preferred risk selection, thus supporting hypothesis 2 rather than hypothesis 1 (that suggests that the relationship between insurance and risk reduction was negative; i.e. moral hazard). With respect to emergency preparedness, insured individuals are less likely to take measures to limit damage than uninsured individuals, behavior which implies a moral hazard problem and supports hypothesis 1. These findings indicate that the nature and timing of the protection measure adoption should be more closely considered than has been so far in previous studies. Our statistical models reveal that purchasing flood insurance is negatively related to obtaining federal disaster assistance, another illustration of moral hazard.
We have extended the usual economic model to test how a variety of behavioral mechanisms can explain flood insurance demand: that is the case for peace of mind, having an external locus of control which implies that individuals expect to have little influence over the risks they face, and having a strong private value of preparing for flood. The positive relationship we find for the latter variable is also supported by previous findings that private values are a stronger predictor than social norms with respect to decisions on whether or not to recycle (Viscusi et al. 2011) .
Individuals who purchase flood insurance and flood-proof their building exhibit private values of preparing for floods and experienced high amounts of flood damage in the past. Individuals who received federal disaster assistance in the past are less likely to both purchase insurance and take risk reduction measures. The lack of locus of control about life in general has a negative impact on flood insurance demand.
The NFIP has been facing problems with a low up take of coverage and increasing flood losses that caused large deficits in the program; the NFIP is currently undergoing reforms 18 to address these issues. Several of our findings are relevant for these reforms. Our finding of the existence of a moral hazard effect of insurance for emergency preparedness measures implies that financial incentives or regulations are needed to encourage insured people to take these measures. For instance, it has been proposed that offering premium discounts to policyholders who reduce their risk can stimulate individuals to better prepare for flooding. Even though we find that risk reduction measures and insurance can be complements, there is a large group of people who do not take these measures for which such financial incentives to encourage risk reduction may also be relevant. Moreover, we find low income to significantly limit insurance purchase. This suggests that addressing affordability should be given attention in efforts of the NFIP to increase the market penetration of flood insurance. The finding that federal disaster assistance crowds out private flood risk reduction and insurance demand suggests that individual flood preparedness can be improved by limiting federal disaster relief, or by offering alternative forms of relief, like loans instead of grants.
Our findings that behavioral characteristics, such as locus of control and private values, influence flood insurance purchases as well as the joint decision to mitigate risk, opens up avenues for further research to study how these may be activated to stimulate flood preparedness such as using information campaigns. Only individuals who owned a house with a ground floor in areas that are prone to flooding were contacted to participate in the survey. The sample was designed as follows: First, a selection was made of census blocks in NYC which fall inside the FEMA 1/100 or 1/500 flood zones and are flooded at least once during the 549 storm simulations of the flood risk model developed by Aerts et al. (2014) . The reason for excluding areas in the FEMA flood zones but are not flooded in the flood risk model is that the FEMA maps in 2012 were outdated, and were being revised by FEMA at that time. By using both the FEMA maps and the flood risk model for the selection of flood-prone areas we can be more confident that the respondents are from areas that can actually be flooded. On the basis of this geographical selection, telephone records were selected to be randomly called by the professional survey company. A first set of questions checked whether the respondent meets the sample criteria. In particular, the location of the home was checked to confirm it is located within the identified flood-prone areas, and respondents were asked whether they own their house and whether it has a ground flood. Only respondents who met these criteria were asked to participate in the remainder of the survey.
Of the qualified respondents, 73% completed the survey which resulted in 1,035 observations.
The high response rate indicates that many floodplain inhabitants were willing to participate in the survey on this theme after NYC experienced flooding from Hurricane Sandy. The sample is close to being representative on key socio-economic characteristics. 43% of the total sample is male. The age range in the total sample is 18-87 years; M=53.82, SD=13.89. Percentage shares in the sample per category of total household income before taxes are 2% for <$15,000, 4% for $15,000-$24,999, 8% for $25,000-$39,999, 24% for $40,000-$79,999, 23% for $80,000-$124,999, 16% for >125,000 and 23% refused to answer. Highest educational attainment is some high school for 3%, high school for 23%, some college for 20%, college graduate for 31%, and postgraduate for 21%, and 2% refused to answer. "Don't know" and "not sure" responses to questions are coded as missing observations for the dependent and explanatory variables in our analysis.
Several questions were included in the survey to elicit indicators of flood risk perceptions, as
shown below. Important quantitative dimensions of risk are its likelihood of occurrence and financial consequences that were elicited by asking respondents about flood probability p and anticipated damage L should her/his residence be flooded. The perceived flood probability was asked by: "Experts have estimated that a flood in Special Flood Hazard Areas in New York occurs on average once in 100 years. Do you think that a flood at your home will occur as often as once in 100 years, or more often or less often?" A follow-up question determined a range of the expected flood probability. This range was then given to the respondent by the interviewer in a question that asked to provide a best-guess estimate. Next, a question asked whether the following applied to the respondent "Some people think that the flood probability is too low to be concerned about. These people find that the flood probability is below their threshold level of concern." The threshold variable is relevant since it has been shown that individuals may ignore risks whose subjective odds are perceived to be below their threshold level of concern (Slovic et al. 1977; Slovic 1987; McClelland et al. 1993 Survey has been used in studies that examine the factors of influence on locus of control (Sastry and Ross, 1998; Welzel and Inglehart, 2010) , and how locus of control influences happiness (Verme, 2009 Number of measures for flood-proofing his/her structure implemented by the respondent ex ante a flood threat Perceived flood probability 1=perceived flood probability is higher than 1/100, 0=otherwise Perceived flood damage Expected flood damage relative to property value Low income Total household income is smaller than $25,000, 0=otherwise High education 1=highest education level is at least college, 0=otherwise External locus of control 1= respondent answered a score 1-5 on the a locus of control scale 1=no control over how life turns out and 10=complete control how life turns out, 0=otherwise Received disaster assistance 1=respondent has received federal disaster assistance to compensate past flood damage, 0=otherwise Strong private value of preparing for floods 1= respondent strongly agrees with the statement "I would be upset if I noticed that someone who got flooded was insufficiently prepared for flooding and needed to request federal compensation for flood damage he suffered", 0=respondent agrees, disagrees, strongly disagrees or neither agrees nor disagrees Flood probability is below 1=respondent indicates that the flood probability is below her/his threshold level threshold level of concern of concern, 0=otherwise Peace of mind 1=respond indicates that s/he is "very much like" or " like" a person who purchases insurance because it gives her/him peace of mind, 0=somewhat, not, not at all like such a person. Experienced flood damage Total damage to building and home contents that the respondent experienced during her/his last flood in thousand $ FEMA 1/100 year flood zone 1= respondents lives in the FEMA 1/100 year flood zone, 0=otherwise FEMA 1/500 year flood zone 1=respondent lives in the FEMA 1/500 year flood zone, 0=otherwise Flood probability Probability that the census block of the respondent is flooded Potential flood water height Mean potential inundation level of the census block of the respondent in feet
